This paper examines whether higher oil price volatility causes a reversal in globalization. Using a large annual panel data set covering 84 countries all over the world from 1984 to 2008, we investigate the impacts of oil price fluctuations on international trade, namely exports and imports. We present strong and robust evidence that international trade flows will be lower when oil prices fluctuate significantly. We therefore conclude that oil price volatility hurts globalization.
Introduction
It is argued that uncertainty arising from oil price volatility may reduce international trade flows because it raises the risks faced by both importers and exporters. The impacts of oil price fluctuations on global trade flows can be understood by the uncertainty channel. Fluctuations in oil prices may create uncertainty about the future path of the oil price, causing consumers to postpone irreversible purchases of consumer durable goods, and also causing firms to postpone irreversible investments. The reduction in domestic consumption and investment expenditures implies a reduction in aggregate demand, and thus reduces international trade.
1 Hence, oil price uncertainty may thus reverse globalization. This paper empirically examines whether higher oil price volatility discourages international trade and thus causes deglobalization. oil prices has a significant negative impact on GDP growth and contributes to a higher inflation rate for most countries (see Hamilton (2009a) , Cologni and Manera (2008) , and Lardic and
Mignon (2008)). Finally, Ordonez et al. (2011) show that the oil price shock is an important driving force of the cyclical labor adjustments in the US labor market, and the job-finding probability is the main transmission mechanism of such a shock.
Other than examining the adverse impacts on the domestic economy, it is also of interest to consider the impacts of spikes and volatility in oil prices from a global perspective. For example, Rubin (2009) argues that expensive oil makes the world become increasingly localized, and will eventually cause the end of globalization. As globalization was dependent on cheap transport, which in turn was dependent on cheap fuel, it is argued that peak oil may reverse globalization.
As higher energy prices are impacting transport costs at an unprecedented rate, the cost of moving goods may become the largest barrier to global trade. Moreover, sluggish output growth and high inflation dampen import demand, and thus decrease international trade flows. Finally, the central bank may tighten monetary policy to offset the inflationary pressure, which results in an increase in interest rates and a further dampening of domestic demand for imports, leading to a decline in global trade.
Several previous studies have shown that oil price shocks affect international trade. Theo-retically, Backus and Crucini (2000) consider an international stochastic growth model incorporating a third country that sells oil. They document that oil price shocks play a substantial role in explaining changes in the terms of trade in major industrialized countries after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Bridgman (2008) constructs a vertical specialization trade model with an energy-using transportation sector to investigate how oil prices affect global trade via changes in transport costs. Empirical evidence provides strong support for the view that oil price shocks have impacts on global economic activity. Using data from Germany, Lutz and Meyer (2009) find that an improvement in international competitiveness limits the negative impacts of increased oil prices. Kilian et al. (2009) show how different oil price shocks (demand and supply shocks) have impacts on several measures of oil exporters' and oil importers' external balances such as the oil trade balance, the nonoil trade balance, the current account, capital gains, and changes in net foreign assets. Korhonen and Ledyaeva (2010) use vector autoregressive (VAR) models to examine the impact of oil price shocks on both oil-producing and oil-consuming economies. For oil exporters, although they benefit from high oil prices directly, they are also hurt by the indirect effects of positive oil price shocks, as countries importing oil will have lower growth and lower import demand, which then curtails the oil producers' exports. As for oil importers, they are hurt directly by positive oil price shocks, but may receive indirect benefits via higher demand from the oil exporters. That is, some of the additional revenues from rising oil prices for oil exporters may be used to increase imports from the rest of the world, helping to stabilize oil-importing countries. Finally, Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2010) implement a battery of tests for structural breaks and find that oil shocks played the main role in determining the changes in trade ratios in the 1970s.
Regarding the impact of oil price volatility on economic activity, it has been shown in Ferderer (1996) that empirically, oil price variability has an adverse impact on aggregate output. Sadorsky (1999) estimates a VAR model and provides evidence that oil price volatility shocks play an important role in affecting real S& P 500 stock returns. Sadorsky (2003) In sum, we thus conclude that oil price fluctuations hurt globalization.
Empirical Strategy
In this section, we first describe how to identify structural oil price shocks in a VAR model proposed by Kilian (2009) . We then present our measures of oil price volatility. Finally, the empirical models to examine the impacts of oil price variability on international trade will be discussed.
Measuring Oil Price Shocks
Using a newly developed measure of global real economic activity, Kilian (2009) employs a structural VAR analysis disentangling demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market and finds that the impacts of oil demand and oil supply shocks are quite different. We consider the following structural VAR model proposed by Kilian (2009):
where
Vector y t is:
where ∆prod t is global crude oil production growth, rea t is a measure of real activity in global industrial commodity markets, and rop t is the log real oil price. It is worth noting that the data for global crude oil production and real global economic activity are available at monthly frequency.
The term e t represents a vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural innovations.
Letting ε t denote the vector of the reduced-form VAR innovations, and following the identification assumptions in Kilian (2009), we have:
According to Kilian (2009) , e os t represents shocks to the global supply of crude oil ("oil supply shocks"). The second structural shock e gd t captures shocks to the global demand for all industrial commodities (including crude oil) that are driven by global real economic activity ("global demand shocks"). Shock e od t is the oil-market-specific demand disturbance, which captures the shift in precautionary demand for crude oil ("oil-market-specific demand shocks", or simply, "oil demand shocks"). That is, it reflects increased concerns about the availability of future oil supplies. We then follow Kilian (2009) to construct measures of the annual shocks by averaging the monthly structural innovations for each year:
where e i m,t represents the i-th structural shock in the m-th month of the t-th year of the sample, and i = {gd, od}. For the oil supply shock, we define it as:
such that a positive value ofξ os t causes an increase in oil prices, which is consistent withξ 
Measuring Oil Price Volatility
We use daily oil price data (op 1. Standard Deviation:
2. Realized Volatility:
3. GARCH(1,1) model: we consider a GARCH(1,1) model for daily oil price returns:
and then compute the annual oil price volatility as the average of the daily conditional variance:
Empirical Model
We now turn to our main focus regarding the impacts of oil price volatility on international trade by considering the following panel regression model:
where j = 1, 2, . . . , N is a country index, and t = 1, 2, . . . , T is a time index. Total real trade volume of country j is the sum of real exports and real imports: Trade j,t = (Exports j,t + Imports j,t ).
We use real GDP of country j to measure domestic demand denoted by Y j,t , while Y * 
Data and Preliminary Tests
To construct annual oil price volatility, we follow Henriques and Sadorsky (2011) Figures 1 and 3 , it is worth noting that oil price volatility rises during periods of sharp oil price increases (such as 1990 and 2008) and periods of sharp oil price declines (such as 1986).
Empirical Results
In Table 3 , we report the benchmark empirical results. Results without the other control variables are shown in the first three columns. Clearly, we have found a negative and significant relationship between lagged oil price volatility and international trade, which is robust to different measures of oil price volatility. That is, higher oil price volatility hurts trade. We then add other explanatory variables as in equation (6) and show the results in columns (4) to (6).
Most of the signs of the coefficients are as expected. An increase in oil price due to oil supply shocks discourages trade. On the other hand, a positive oil-specific demand shock has positive impacts on trade. Finally, higher domestic and foreign demand (proxied by domestic real GDP and distance-weighted sum of foreign real GDP) induce larger trade. All of the above estimates are highly statistically significant. Although the impact of a positive global demand shock is not consistent with prior expectation, the estimate is statistically insignificant. Does oil price volatility have a substantial effect on trade after controlling for other determinants? Yes. We can see that the estimates of the coefficients on the three different measures of oil price volatility are still negative and highly significant. To sum up, we have shown strong evidence that higher oil price volatility leads to a reduction in international trade.
We further investigate whether the relationship between oil price volatility and trade may differ for net oil exporters and net oil importers. According to the data for exports and imports of crude oil including lease condensate (thousand barrels per day) in 2009, 10 the net oil exporters in our sample countries are Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Gabon, Guatemala, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Venezuela. We then consider the following empirical model:
where for all t,
1, if country j is a net oil exporter, 0, otherwise, is a dummy variable to indicate a net oil-exporting country. Hence, β 1 and β 2 are coefficients measuring the impacts of oil price volatility on international trade for net oil-exporting and net oil-importing countries, respectively.
The results presented in Table 4 suggest that for net oil-importing countries, oil price volatility significantly reduces trade. However, for net oil exporters, the impacts of oil price volatility are no longer statistically significant. In Table 4 , we also report the F statistics and associated p-values for testing the null hypothesis that H 0 : β 1 = β 2 . Low p-values for the F test provide evidence that volatility has different consequences for a country's trade flows, which depends on whether the country is a net oil exporter or not.
Finally, we investigate how oil price volatility affects exports and imports separately. In Table 5, the dependent variables are changes in (log) real merchandise exports (∆ log(Exports j,t )) and imports (∆ log(Imports j,t )), respectively. Evidence presented in Table 5 indicates that higher oil price volatility hurts exports significantly. However, it is worth nothing that in terms of imports, the impacts are negative though insignificant. As a further investigation, we focus on how oil price variations affect real exports and real imports for net oil exporters versus net oil importers. Results in Table 6 show that for net oil importers, oil price fluctuations have signif-icantly negative impacts on both exports and imports. As for net oil exporters, the impacts on imports are all positive while the results are mixed for exports. However, all of the estimates on the volatility's impacts are statistically insignificant for net oil exporters.
Energy Efficiency and the Volatility's Impacts
For oil importers the effect of oil price volatility on trade flow may depend on energy efficiency.
That is, the negative impact may decrease due to the declining share of energy in consumption, which in turn may result from more service-oriented economies, more energy-efficient technologies, and more diversified types of energy consumption.
In order to examine this issue, we consider the following empirical model for net oil im-
where γ(e j,t ) = γ 0 + γ 1 e j,t , and e j,t is the total primary energy consumption per unit of GDP obtained from the US Energy Information Administration. Lower e j,t indicates lower energy intensity and higher energy efficiency. If high energy efficiency help mitigate the reverse effects of oil price volatility, it is expected that γ 0 < 0 and γ 1 < 0. According to the estimates of γ in Table 7 , no evidence is found that high energy efficiency help mitigate the negative impacts of oil price fluctuations.
High-Frequency Data
In our main empirical exercise, using a panel data set at an annual frequency allows us to investigate a large number of countries (84 countries 
Concluding Remarks
This paper investigated whether high oil price volatility causes reverse globalization, i.e., whether or not oil price fluctuations discourage international trade. Using a large annual panel data set covering 84 countries all over the world from 1984 to 2008, we found strong evidence that oil price volatility does decrease global trade flows. We have also considered different structural oil price shocks following Kilian (2009)'s approach. The evidence suggests that the increase in oil prices due to oil supply shocks has a significantly negative effect on international trade. On the other hand, positive oil-specific demand shocks cause higher trade flows.
We further divide the data set into two categories, net oil exporters and net oil importers, to see whether the oil price volatility international-trade nexus changes for different types of countries. We show that for net oil-importing countries, the negative impacts on trade from oil price fluctuations are statistically significant, while an insignificantly positive impact is found for oil-exporting countries.
The main empirical findings are robust to different measures of globalization (trade, exports, or imports) and different data frequency. Moreover, it is found that energy efficiency is unable to mitigate the negative impact of oil price volatility on international trade flows for oil importers.
Our quantitative examination thus concludes that oil price fluctuations hurt globalization. F-stat and [p-value] are the F statistic and associated p-value for testing H 0 : β 1 = β 2 = 0. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. = 1 indicates net oil exporters while D j,t = 0 represents net oil importers. Standard errors are in parentheses. F-stat and p-value are the F statistic and associated p-value for testing H 0 : β 1 = β 2 = 0. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. M6 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
